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We acknowledge the potential for abuse when a defendant may
be subjected to repeated punitive damage awards arising out of
the same conduct. Yet, like the many other courts which have
addressed the problem, we are unable to devise a fair and effective solution.
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Waters1
INTRODUCTION
Damages can add up to super-punitive amounts in unintended ways. To take a textbook example: The Defendant has
caused an industrial accident or other mass tort. Plaintiff 1
sues, winning punitive damages based on the reprehensibility
of that original act. Plaintiff 2 also sues—and also wins punitive damages on the same grounds. So do Plaintiff 3, Plaintiff 4,
and so forth.2 If each of these punitive awards is directed at the
same general badness of that original act, then these punishments are redundant.3 When such redundancy occurs, even
638 So. 2d 502, 505 (Fla. 1994).
To anticipate some of the analysis yet to come: Existing legal solutions
for such a situation are widely seen as haphazard and inadequate. See infra
Part I. Of special note is the asymmetry in preclusion law, which cannot
block such redundancy (because the plaintiffs are not parties in each other’s
cases)—and may very well aggravate it (if the plaintiffs are able to use
nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel against the defendant). See, e.g.,
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 884–85 (2008) (holding that nonparties cannot be bound by the preclusive effect of past judgments or findings, except
under limited conditions); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331
(1979) (endorsing the use of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel).
Meanwhile, aggregation devices (such as the mandatory punitive damages
class action) that might serve as occasional discouragements to redundant
awards have fallen into disfavor. For a fuller analysis, see infra Part I.
3 The potential for redundancy can also be described, of course, in terms
of overdeterrence rather than duplicative retribution. (The commonly advanced—and often conflicting—conceptual aims of punitive damages will
1
2
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damages that are meant to be punitive can reach surprisingly
punitive levels.4
This Essay addresses two distinct ways in which unexpectedly excessive damages may arise. The first and more straightforward problem is redundant punitive damages, as in the
scenario above.5 The second and more subtle problem is what
be considered in more detail in Part I.) For instance, overdeterrence will obviously occur if the punitive damages award in every individual plaintiff’s
case is set at the fully deterrent amount, and multiple plaintiffs win this
amount. The need to avoid overdeterrence is clear when the aim of damages is assumed to be “optimal deterrence” (that is, forcing actors to internalize the full social costs of their conduct). But avoiding overdeterrence is
also useful when the assumed aim is “absolute deterrence” (that is, erasing
all private gains to the actor from the conduct, in order to reduce the activity level to zero); the most familiar reason is a need to avoid distorting marginal deterrence. See George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws,
78 J. Pol. Econ. 526, 527 (1970) (“If the offender will be executed for a minor
assault and for a murder, there is no marginal deterrence to murder.”).
4 Courts and commentators have given this problem various names, including “successive” or “multiple” punitive damages—or simply the “multiple punishments problem.” See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003) (noting “the possibility of multiple punitive
damages awards for the same conduct”); Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1385
(3d Cir. 1993) (en banc) (“successive punitive damages awards”); Thomas B.
Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as
Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 583 (2003);
Jim Gash, Solving the Multiple Punishments Problem: A Call for a National
Punitive Damages Registry, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1613 (2005); Catherine M.
Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 Yale L.J. 347, 428
(2003) (“multiple punishments”).
5 More complicated variations of this simplified initial scenario are addressed in Part I. Note that rather than calling the problem “multiple” or
“successive” punishment, I favor the term “redundant” in part to recognize
that not all repetitions of punitive damages are excessive. Multiple awards
of punitive damages may well be necessary (and thus not redundant) to
reach the proper level of deterrence or retribution for a given act by a defendant; this might be especially true given the current state of constitutional constraints on the sizes of awards. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425
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we might call the “hyper-enforcement” of statutory damages:
when successful enforcement in fact occurs more frequently
than is implicitly assumed in the statutory scheme (with
awards preset at super-compensatory levels to make up for
some expected degree of underenforcement). The result there
is that damages not meant to be punitive can nonetheless stack
up to punishing effect, most famously when thousands or millions of claims are aggregated. Both problems are classic concerns that have defied tidy resolution despite decades of anxious recognition by courts and commentators.6
These two classes of problems are united by a central feature
that has yet to receive conceptual articulation: In each context,
the damages a defendant should pay for a single bad act contain both a “variable” component (which properly varies with
the number of victims or nominal counts), as well as a “fixed”
component (which should be awarded only once for the given
act).7 The crucial mistake that can lead to surprisingly punitive
damages in each context is repeatedly awarding the “fixed”
portion along with the “variable” portion when multiple
awards are based on the same underlying act.
A procedural solution for neutralizing such redundancy is
readily suggested by this conceptual framing: allow courts to
(warning that “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive
and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process”). Such crude constraints, of course, do not generally prevent the repetition of punitive damages from reaching the point of redundancy.
6 The first problem is indeed a textbook example of redundancy—and of
courts expressing helplessness given the current state of the law. See Mark
A. Franklin, Robert L. Rabin & Michael D. Green, Tort Law and Alternatives 774 (9th ed. 2011). Part I elaborates on this problem. For examples of
commentary on the second problem, see Section II.A.
7 Alternatively, for a single course of conduct that involves many acts, the
“variable” component is the amount that should vary with the number of
acts, and the “fixed” component is the amount that should be awarded only
once for that single course of conduct.
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run concurrently the “fixed” component of these repeated
awards. This Essay explains how it can be applied to each of
the two classes of problems. In earlier work, I have illustrated
how the use of concurrent damages can repair the gross inaccuracies that occur when statutory damages awards are blindly
pegged to a nominal count of violations rather than to the conduct’s real effects.8 Here, the focus shifts to a more complicated
form of redundancy in damages, and thus to a more nuanced
use of concurrent damages: The court should identify the portion of each damages award that would be redundant if repeated in other awards (in the same case or in other cases) and
then designate that portion to run concurrently with the other
awards.
Part I will explore how courts can apply this solution to the
first problem, that of punitive damages being redundantly
awarded to multiple plaintiffs for the same original act. In one
basic approach, a court might view compensatory damages as
the “variable” component and punitive damages as the “fixed”
component of its award. On this view, the court would run
(only) its punitive damages concurrently with those awarded
by other courts.
Refinements to this baseline method may be needed, however, depending on what the court assumes the purpose of punitive damages to be, on how many individual punitive damages awards are needed to serve that purpose, on whether the
court takes a defendant- or plaintiff-focused view of punitive
damages, and on whether the court is allowed to use concurrence in anticipation of future awards (as is possible in concurrent criminal sentencing9). These variations are analyzed in
Bert I. Huang, Concurrent Damages, 100 Va. L. Rev. 711 (2014).
See Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463, 1473 (2012) (endorsing the
power of federal courts to run criminal sentences either consecutively or
concurrently with anticipated but yet-to-be-adjudicated state criminal sentences for the same conduct).
8
9
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Part I, along with the general procedural advantages of the
concurrent damages solution.
Part II will turn to the statutory damages problem. Statutory
damages are often said to be set at super-compensatory levels,
based on the premise that enforcement will be imperfect, that
proof will be difficult, or that private suits will need extra inducement. But such an understanding also implies that whenever successful enforcement is more likely than assumed in the
original statutory design, the resulting expected damages will
be overly deterrent.
Two variants of this hyper-enforcement problem will be addressed, along with heuristics for using concurrent damages as
a corrective for each. The first variant occurs when higher
counts of violations attract more enforcement attention or
more avid plaintiffs, or lead to easier detection or proof.
A second variant arises due to minimum statutory per-count
awards that are set at high levels to encourage individual
plaintiffs to sue on claims that would otherwise be too small to
be worth litigating. The problem is that beyond a certain
threshold, there is no longer any need for such subsidies to
continue accumulating with every count.10 And where thousands or even millions of counts can be claimed or aggregated
in a given case, the redundant accumulation of these inducements to sue can reach astonishing sums.11
Finally, the Conclusion will propose a thought experiment
that highlights both limitations and possible extensions of the
present analysis: What if these sorts of excessive damages are
10 The desired litigation subsidy may thus be understood as the “fixed”
component of the damages scheme, in such a case.
11 Most famous may be the flurry of class actions under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952,
based on errors in printing customer receipts—such as the suit against
Chuck E. Cheese restaurants with claims potentially amounting to $1.9 billion. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
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not “surprises” at all, but instead are messages aimed at deterring overconfident actors who think they are more likely to
evade enforcement than they really are?12 Is “acoustic separation” then useful, or even necessary, for the practical application of concurrent damages?
I. REDUNDANT PUNITIVE DAMAGES
“Overkill” is what Judge Henry Friendly famously called
it—and yet he could point to no general solution to the potentially “staggering” problem of redundant punitive damages.13
The courts have not had better luck in the forty years since.14
Neither has Congress.15 The concern seems to have motivated
12 The analysis thus emphasizes the essential point that perceptions—
including misperceptions—are what matter for ex ante incentives.
13 Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967)
(“We have the gravest difficulty in perceiving how claims for punitive
damages in such a multiplicity of actions throughout the nation can be so
administered as to avoid overkill. . . . We know of no principle whereby the
first punitive award exhausts all claims for punitive damages and would
thus preclude future judgments . . . .”).
14 This is not for any lack of concern or notice of the problem. See, e.g.,
Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1385 (3d Cir. 1993) (en banc) (“[T]he point of
‘overkill’ has been reached with respect to punitive damages in asbestos
litigation.”). Indeed, judges have long warned of potential constitutional
implications. See, e.g., Racich v. Celotex Corp., 887 F.2d 393, 398 (2d Cir.
1989) (noting that “the multiple imposition of punitive damages for the
same course of conduct may raise serious constitutional concerns”); In re
Fed. Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1188 (8th Cir. 1982) (“Unlimited multiple punishment for the same act determined in a succession of individual
lawsuits and bearing no relation to the defendants’ culpability or the actual
injuries suffered by victims, would violate the sense of ‘fundamental fairness’ that is essential to constitutional due process.”). But the U.S. Supreme
Court has yet to address the issue directly. See infra note 17.
15 Two attempts in the Senate failed in committee. See Multiple Punitive
Damages Fairness Act of 1995, S. 671, 104th Cong. (1995) (introduced by
Senator Orrin Hatch); Multiple Punitive Damages Fairness Act of 1997, S.
78, 105th Cong. (1997) (re-introduced by Senator Hatch).
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the U.S. Supreme Court in developing its due process limitations,16 and yet the Court has also studiously avoided confronting the problem head-on.17 A few states have devised a mixed
bag of constraints, such as offsets or flat bans on later awards,
but there has been little coherence among their approaches.18
A. Concurrent Damages as a Solution
The concurrent damages approach offers the hope of an analytically coherent solution. At least, it offers a clear conceptual
frame for understanding what any fix for the problem should
aspire to do. As an initial exploration, the following analysis
will sketch the starting principles for running punitive damages concurrently, note some potential advantages and obstacles, and touch on how concurrence relates to other procedural
devices (such as preclusion and aggregation). The analysis will
focus on how to extract the right amount of punitive damages
from the defendant and not on how that windfall should be

See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423
(2003) (noting the problem of multiple punitive damages awards).
17 See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 612 n.4 (1996) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (noting that the Court declines “to address the question of
multiple punitive damages awards stemming from the same alleged misconduct”). The Court’s latest guidance in Philip Morris USA v. Williams
seems to inch closer to the problem: Juries are not to punish the defendant
for harms done to non-parties—and yet they may still consider such nonparty harms in judging the act’s reprehensibility when assessing punitive
damages. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353–55 (2007). But
this guidance cannot bar the redundancy that occurs when each jury
awards its own plaintiff for the inherent reprehensibility of the act (as supposed in the initial illustration above). Moreover, the case provides cover
for jury awards that do count harms to others under the rubric of reprehensibility.
18 On the relative virtues and shortcomings of such approaches, see infra
note 46 and accompanying text.
16
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given out to plaintiffs,19 though it will make note of various judicial approaches already in use for allocating a single award
among multiple claimants. Other important considerations—
such as how the concept of concurrence may be put to work in
the context of repeated settlements20—are reserved for future
analysis.21
How punitive damages are allocated among plaintiffs is a secondary
concern, conceptually, under the modern view that punitive damages are
defendant-focused rather than plaintiff-focused. Punitive damages are now
generally understood to be a windfall for (rather than an entitlement of)
plaintiffs—a view reflected in split-recovery statutes that divert a large
share of punitive damages away from the winning plaintiff and into the
state treasury or to charitable uses. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554
U.S. 471, 492 (2008) (“Regardless of the alternative rationales over the years,
the consensus today is that punitives are aimed not at compensation but
principally at retribution and deterring harmful conduct.”); Sharkey, supra
note 4, at 370–80. This distinction may be blurred in those cases where punitive damages as a practical matter serve to make up for gaps in compensation or serve as an inducement to bring suit. Although such circumstances are omitted from the present analysis, needless to say, they would
not generally justify awarding exactly the full measure of punitive damages
to every plaintiff. Moreover, creating a concurrence option at least allows
the judge to make the call in any case involving such a tradeoff—between
reducing lawsuits or undercompensating, on the one hand, and overdeterring or overpunishing, on the other—as opposed to automatically defaulting in favor of the latter. It should also be noted that, whenever it may be
useful for more than one plaintiff to receive some amount of punitive damages, the concurrent damages option (which allows the possibility that punitive damages will be shared among plaintiffs) is superior to the firstcome, first-served approach used in some states, which permits an award of
punitive damages to only the first plaintiff. See infra notes 41–46 and accompanying text.
20 For a recent illustration of taking a prior settlement into account in assessing later fines and penalties—in effect running them concurrently—see
the Justice Department’s plea agreement with SAC Management. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Guilty Plea
Agreement with SAC Capital Management Companies (Nov. 4, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/November13/
19

DRAFT – AUG. 2014

10
1. “Fixed” and “Variable” Damages
One simple principle should guide the use of concurrent punitive damages: If a judge believes that some portion of the total damages in a case before him reflects an amount that this
defendant should not be made to pay repeatedly, then he
should designate this portion to run concurrently with the
awards in other cases. To use the vocabulary introduced earlier, the judge should distinguish between the “fixed” and
“variable” components of the total award in that case—in effect allowing only the variable component to be repeated in
other cases, by running the fixed component concurrently.
Consider this most basic of possible scenarios (call it Scenario 1): Suppose that the judge views the punitive damages in
the case as representing full legal retribution for the defen-

SACPleaPR.php (“Because the SAC Companies have already agreed to pay
$616 million to the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission to resolve related civil insider trading charges, that amount will be credited against today’s penalty [of $1.8 billion], and therefore, the additional payment required under this Agreement will be approximately $1.2 billion.”).
21 It may be worth noting here, however incompletely, three starting
points for the analysis of settlements. First, the use of concurrence (or not)
by the courts in determining punitive damages awards will presumably
cast the shadow in which settlements are negotiated. Second, as a general
matter, settlements already must specify the scope of the defendants’ conduct for which liability is being released. Thus the question is not whether
that information must be generated, but whether it is kept confidential between the settling parties—and if anything, one might expect the attractive
prospect of later courts running their awards concurrently with past settlements to induce defendants to publicize the scope of conduct covered by
those settlements. Third, the implementation mechanics of distributing
funds from a settlement to future judgments (or future settlements) would
not be entirely new problems, as solutions have already been developed in
some contexts. See, e.g., In re Carolina Tobacco Co., 360 B.R. 702, 706–07 (D.
Or. 2007) (describing the escrow account required by a settlement with
states for the payment of future judgment awards).
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dant’s entire course of conduct. He would then run the whole
of the punitive award concurrently with those in other cases.
The following refinements to this prototype approach illustrate how the use of concurrent damages can be adapted to
varying circumstances: first, under competing theories about
the purpose of punitive damages; second, along the spectrum
of views of punitive damages, from defendant-focused to
plaintiff-focused; and third, when courts are able or unable to
run damages concurrently with future awards.
2. Differing Aims of Punitive Damages
The consensus modern view is that punitive damages serve
a dual function—retribution and deterrence.22 Yet these aims
do not always align. The amount needed for retribution may
not be equal to what is needed to deter. Nor is there always
agreement on what each term means, and one might sensibly
think that the best meaning should vary by context. Consider
the question of what amount is needed to “deter”: Does that
refer to what is conventionally called optimal deterrence (that
is, loss internalization)? Or rather, to absolute deterrence (that
is, erasing any gains from the misconduct)?23 Or to still some
other understanding of deterrence?

See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 492 (2008) (“Regardless of the alternative rationales over the years, the consensus today is
that punitives are aimed not at compensation but principally at retribution
and deterring harmful conduct.”); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S.
559, 568 (1996) (“Punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a
State’s legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its
repetition.”).
23 It should be emphasized that for both the optimal deterrence and absolute deterrence approaches, accuracy in damages is useful—not least because of the familiar need to set marginal deterrence correctly. See Stigler,
supra note 3.
22
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Fortunately, the general usefulness of concurrence in reducing redundancy does not much depend on any particular answer to these questions. Yet in operation variations do arise
depending on which purpose is assumed, because it affects the
question of what portion of damages is understood to be the
“fixed” component that should run concurrently across cases.
As a practical matter, the importance of these variations may
well be washed out by the rough-justice nature of assigning
monetary damages, and especially punitive damages, in the
first place. But it is still useful for the sake of conceptual clarity
to point them out.
Deterrence versus retribution. — First, consider the distinction
between the dual aims. How might a court focused on deterrence (whether optimal or absolute) differ from a retributionoriented court in deciding which portion of the damages
award to designate as running concurrently? One critical difference is the role of compensatory damages. A judge taking a
retributive approach may view them as irrelevant to punishment (as we have assumed in Scenario 1 above). By contrast,
the degree of deterrence depends on the total award, including
compensatory damages.24
Thus a judge who believes she has achieved the full measure
of deterrence, via the total damages in the case before her,
would not want any of that amount to be revisited on this same
defendant (for the same conduct) by other courts. The sum of
the compensatory and punitive damages in this case alone is
all the deterrence that the judge thinks is needed. The court
may well have reached this result by using punitive damages
to make up the difference between the compensatory damages
24 This is true under both the loss-internalization (optimal deterrence) and
the gains-erasing (absolute deterrence) views. Compensatory damages are
more closely related to the former, for obvious reasons. But under either
view they should be recognized as part of the total costs to the defendant,
and thus part of the deterrent.
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and the desired deterrent amount. In essence, the “fixed” component of damages here is the entire award.
What this deterrence-oriented judge should run concurrently, in theory, are the total damages (not only the punitive
damages). But in practice, she cannot do so. She must actually
award the compensatory damages in the present case. So the
best she can do is to say that the punitive damages are to run
concurrently. At this point, she may seem to be acting identically to the retribution-oriented judge in Scenario 1. But here is
the crucial difference: The deterrence-oriented judge should
run the punitive damages in this case concurrently with not
only the punitive damages in other cases, but with any damages in other cases, including those that are compensatory.
Note that although this approach minimizes overdeterrence,
there may still be some slippage—if courts can only run their
damages concurrently with past awards. Suppose that the first
court awards damages in the fully deterrent amount. Then the
best that the second court can do is to run its own punitive
damages award concurrently with the total damages in the first
case. Because the defendant will also pay the compensatory
damages in this second case, the defendant ends up overpaying relative to the accurately deterrent amount (though this redundancy is far less than without concurrence).25 This structural feature, that a court cannot designate its own
compensatory damages to run concurrently, is a complication
for the deterrence approach—but not for the retribution approach assumed in Scenario 1.
Shared and individual components of retribution. — Next, let us
consider how courts focused on only one of the dual aims, retribution, might nonetheless vary in their ideal use of concur-

As we shall see, reducing or avoiding such slippage may be possible if
the courts can also run damages concurrently with future awards. See infra
Subsection I.A.3.
25
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rence. Imagine a variation on Scenario 1: What if a judge does
not view the punitive damages in her case as reflecting the full
legal retribution this defendant should have to face, and so she
believes that further punitive damages in other cases may be
warranted (to some extent)? For instance, she might see her
role as assigning punitive damages to serve retribution on behalf of this specific plaintiff, but not on behalf of other victims.26
She might then conceive of this plaintiff’s total punitive
damages as having two parts: One portion serves the aim of
retribution for the defendant’s reprehensibility as directed only
at this specific plaintiff. She may well expect other judges to
award such a portion to their plaintiffs as well. She would
view these per-plaintiff portions not as redundant, but as a
“variable” component of punitive damages and thus properly
cumulative across cases.
Meanwhile, she may see a separate portion of this plaintiff’s
punitive damages as serving the aim of retribution for the inherent, general badness of the defendant’s conduct (from
which this plaintiff also suffered)—the “fixed” quantum of
reprehensibility shared among the victims, punishable by a
one-time levy against the defendant. This portion of the punishment would be redundant if other courts also awarded it.
(And yet at least one court must mete out this part of the punishment.) Because retribution on behalf of any plaintiff would
be incomplete without this component, each court’s award
should include it.27 But then each court should also run this

26 The judge would thus be acting in the spirit of Philip Morris, discussed
supra note 17.
27 Note again that including such a shared component of reprehensibility
would not likely run afoul of Philip Morris (as discussed supra note 17) because it is properly part of the punishment for this plaintiff’s harm—just as
it would be for any other plaintiff.
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portion of the punitive award (and only this portion) concurrently with the awards in other cases.
The usual principle thus still applies, but now the “fixed”
portion is only a subset of the punitive damages in each individual case. The narrower point here is that the portion of the
damages a court runs concurrently need not always be the full
punitive damages award.28
The more general point is that concurrence is an option, not a
command. Its use can be flexibly adapted to understandings of
punitive damages that vary from judge to judge, or from situation to situation.29
3. Anticipation of Future Awards
Should the concurrence device be only backward-looking,
with later courts running their new awards concurrently with
past awards? Or should it be used even by earlier courts, in a
forward-looking way, as is possible with concurrent criminal
sentencing?30 There is no conceptual reason that concurrence
cannot be used in anticipation of future awards—and there are
good practical reasons to encourage such use. Concurrence is a
more powerful, and more user-friendly, tool when it can be
used by earlier courts as well as by later courts.
Think again of the deterrence-focused judges described
above, who are hamstrung by not being able to run compensatory damages concurrently. If concurrence is only backwardlooking, then even if all punitive damages run concurrently,
The chosen subset may be of any size, of course: At one extreme, the
“subset” may be as large as all of the punitive damages (as it was in Scenario 1 above). At the other extreme, it may be a null set, in which case the
judge forgoes concurrence altogether.
29 The complications that can arise when successive judges (dealing with
the same conduct) disagree about the use of concurrence will be explored in
the next section.
30 See, e.g., Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463 (2012).
28
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the compensatory damages will continue to accumulate case
by case—each time causing the defendant to overpay further
beyond the fully deterrent amount.
But notice how the problem dissipates if concurrence can be
used in a forward-looking, anticipatory way. In the first case,
the judge announces that the punitive damages award is to run
concurrently with any past or future damages (both compensatory and punitive) for the same course of conduct.31 The task
for the second judge is identical, and so forth for each later
court. As successive cases occur, their formal punitive awards
not only run concurrently with each other—but also partially
or fully absorb the accumulation of compensatory damages.
To illustrate, consider a defendant who causes identical
harms to Plaintiffs 1 through 5. Suppose that for this act, the
courts adopt an optimal deterrence purpose for punitive damages. The courts are (collectively) aiming for full loss internalization; that is, aggregate damages should total five times the
individual harm. Court 1 achieves this optimal deterrence
amount by awarding compensatory damages (one times the
harm) and makes up the rest using punitive damages (four
times the harm). Suppose Court 2 does the same.
Imagine if Court 1 can run its punitive damages concurrently with future damages, including Court 2’s compensatory
damages. Now both Court 1 and Court 2 can simply say, “My
punitive damages run concurrently with any past or future
damages in any other cases.” First the defendant will pay one
measure of harm to each of Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 (as compensatory damages). Suppose the defendant then pays three
further measures of harm to Plaintiff 1, as punitive damages.
Now, Court 2’s punitive damages award is also satisfied via

By doing so, the first judge has in effect solved the next judge’s problem
of not being able to declare that compensatory damages are to run concurrently (because the first judge has already made that happen).
31
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concurrence, because those four measures of harm have been
paid to Plaintiff 1. At the same time, Court 1’s punitive damages award is also fully satisfied, because three measures of it
have been directly paid to Plaintiff 1, and one measure is running concurrently with Plaintiff 2’s compensatory damages.32
(The logic works just as well if any or all of the three extra
measures of harm are paid to Plaintiff 2 instead.)
The defendant has thus discharged his liability upon paying
five times the harm, as desired. At the same time, the defendant cannot satisfy both courts’ awards by paying any less.
Moreover, further judgments (by Courts 3, 4, and 5) are similarly absorbed; in particular, the compensatory damages that
must be paid to those plaintiffs are credited to the punitive
damages of the other courts, and again the defendant will not
ever pay more (nor can it get away with paying less) than the
optimal amount of five times the harm.
The illustration above shows how the use of anticipatory
concurrence can mitigate the slippage problem noted above.
More importantly, it highlights an approach in which each
court need only follow a simple heuristic, one that relieves
them of needing to know how many other courts are giving
awards, and how much those awards might be. Unlike other
possible anticipatory adjustments (such as reducing damages
in an earlier case based on a prediction that later cases will
arise), no such guesswork is needed here: A court need only
declare that its awards are to run concurrently with any past or
future awards.
Allocating among plaintiffs. — There is a tradeoff to such simplicity at the adjudication stage, however, in that the courts
32 In contrast, if concurrence is only possible in a backward-looking way,
then Court 2 would run its punitive damages concurrently with Court 1’s
damages award; but the compensatory damages in Court 2 would push the
defendant’s payments from the optimal deterrence amount of five times
harm up to six times harm (and so forth for each further case).
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will then need to make practical determinations about how to
allocate the concurrent amount among the plaintiffs who do
materialize. Allocation of this sort is a familiar (if not always
an easy) task for the courts. For instance, think of bankruptcy
proceedings, “contribution” among joint tortfeasors, or any
case involving multiple plaintiffs sharing a “limited fund.”
One might even think of such allocation among plaintiffs as a
sort of joint-and-several recovery.
These analogies suggest two points: First, in the present context there is arguably less at stake in precisely how the concurrent amount is allocated than in the other settings. The reason
is that punitive damages are generally understood to be the
penalty the defendant deserves to pay, not compensation that
plaintiffs deserve to receive;33 this is perhaps best illustrated by
“split-recovery” statutes that reallocate a large share of punitive damages away from winning plaintiffs to the state treasury or to charitable funds.34 Second, as a technical matter, the
various devices that the courts have used to serve these other
allocation needs—such as escrows or trusts, equitable allocation principles, or time limits for further plaintiffs to come
forward—may be adaptable to the distribution of the concurrent award.35 For example: Court 1 can require the defendant
See supra note 19.
See, e.g., 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2–1207 (2012); Iowa Code § 668A.1(2)(b)
(2013); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31.735 (West 2013). For further analysis of such
“split-recovery” statutes, see Sharkey, supra note 4, at 375–80.
35 See, e.g., Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1394 (3d Cir. 1993) (en banc)
(Weis, J., dissenting) (observing that in another case, “[t]he district court intervened to impose measures for a more equitable distribution of the funds
and eventually approved an arrangement that altered the distribution process so that those most seriously injured were paid first. In addition, a serious attempt was made to predict future claims so that present and future
claimants would be paid an equitable percentage of their claims’ value.” (citations omitted)). Courts have used escrow accounts for the payment of future judgment awards. See, e.g., In re Carolina Tobacco Co., 360 B.R. 702,
33
34
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to pay Plaintiff 1 her compensatory award immediately, but set
aside funds in escrow or trust for the punitive award, on the
understanding that Plaintiff 1 will be paid an equitable share of
those reserved funds after a fixed time period (a share that depends on how many other plaintiffs have won punitive damages in that time).36 Court 2 can then require that some or all of
the payment to Plaintiff 2 come from that initial escrow or trust
(which Court 1 will allow because that is the very point of setting up such a fund), or Court 1 can release an appropriate
amount of the reserved funds back to the defendant, based on
the amount the defendant verifies it has directly paid to Plaintiff 2.37
706–07 (D. Or. 2007) (describing escrow account required by a settlement
with states for the payment of future judgment awards). Courts have also
used trusts to collect and distribute punitive damages awards. See, e.g.,
Sampson v. Vasey, No. LA28882, 2007 WL 4555839, at *1 (Iowa Dist. Ct.
Sept. 4, 2007) (“[T]he punitive damages shall be deposited into the plaintiff’s attorney’s trust account for distribution after reduction of attorney fees
and a proportionate share of the out of pocket costs of recovery with 25% of
the gross recovery of punitive damages to the Plaintiff and the remainder
paid into the civil reparations trust fund.” (citing Fernandez v. Curley, 463
N.W.2d 5 (Iowa 1990) regarding Iowa’s split-recovery statute)); Payne v.
Cmty. Blood Ctr., No. 0210-10211, 2004 WL 5400536, at *3 (Or. Cir. Ct. Oct.
25, 2004) (“[T]he Court notes that allegations of punitive damages remain
pending against Defendant Cryolife, Inc., and that both compensatory and
punitive damages may, at some future time, be deposited into the Trust.”).
36 It will likely be in the defendant’s interest to inform Court 1 of any
other future potential punitive damages awards (and future claimants) it
may face for the same conduct once Court 1 has decided on the amount of
punitive damages and is considering whether to run them concurrently.
37 To be clear, each plaintiff will receive its full compensatory damages.
But beyond that, how much of the remaining windfall goes to Plaintiff 1
and how much goes to Plaintiff 2 can be guided by any equities in play. As
a practical matter, such equities may be weighed by the fund administrator,
as is commonly done in distributing a “limited fund” or class-wide damages. The possibility of allocating among plaintiffs based on the equities—
rather than based on factors such as who won the race to the courthouse—
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When courts disagree. — A conceptually more important
complication is that successive courts may disagree about
whether the punitive awards (or how much of the awards)
should run concurrently, in the first place. The mechanism illustrated above may seem to favor the courts that do think the
award should run concurrently, in that a court always has the
power to unilaterally reduce how much the defendant pays to
that particular plaintiff (with the compensatory amount as the
presumptive floor) but cannot require another court to award
more. For example, Court 2 may decide to run its punitive
damages award concurrently with that assessed by Court 1.
But, assuming it does not manipulatively overinflate its own
award, Court 2 cannot undo Court 1’s decision to run punitive
damages concurrently with later awards. The influence of
Court 1 is also limited, however: Undermining Court 1’s intentions (in favor of those courts that think the punitive awards
should accumulate) is still possible if more courts decline to run
their awards concurrently. The reason is that Court 1’s use of
concurrence can only effectively discount future awards by the
amount of punitive damages that Court 1 itself has assessed.
Extending this logic further, then, one might see the end result
of the successive courts’ independent decisions about concurrence to be, loosely speaking, a sort of weighted average of
their choices.38

may be seen as a further advantage of the concurrence option over the alternative devices noted in Subsection I.B.2.
38 To extend the earlier illustration: If Courts 1, 2, 3, and 4 all run their
awards concurrently as before but Court 5 refuses to do so, then the defendant will end up paying nine (as opposed to five) measures of individual
harm; this is still less than the multiplier of 25 that would occur in the absence of a concurrence option.
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B. Procedural Advantages
This section will highlight a few procedural advantages of
using the concurrent punitive damages device. The wellspring
of these advantages is the conceptual integrity of this approach: Concurrence is not an ad hoc adjustment or judicial
“fudging” (in contrast to preemptive reductions of earlier
awards or complete bars on later awards). Quite the opposite.
The concurrence mechanism neatly suits the reality of the overlapping enforcement problem: When there are concurrent enforcers, isn’t the most natural solution just to give concurrent
awards?
1. Information Costs
Think back to this salutary aspect of using anticipatory concurrence: Hardly any anticipation is needed at all. The court
need not be aware of other cases addressing the same conduct—much less of whether those cases have resulted (or will
result) in awards of any given size. Court 1 does not even need
to know that it is Court 1, and Court 2 does not need to know
that it is Court 2.39
This feature speaks to a more general advantage of the concurrence approach: Each court can determine its own award as
if it had the only case against this defendant. Each can simply
declare the full amount of punishment deserved, on behalf of
its plaintiff. Notably, such undiminished declarations may also
serve the public notice and socially expressive aims of allowing

39 Note again, however, that as a practical matter the defendant will have
good reason to inform Court 1 about the possibility of future punitive damages in Court 2, once Court 1 has decided to award punitive damages.
Likewise, if Court 2 imposes punitive damages and is considering running
them concurrently, the defendant will want to inform Court 2 about the
penalty it already faces in Court 1.
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each court, in each jurisdiction and in each plaintiff’s case, to
mark its own condemnation of the act.
The practical upshot is that the information demands on the
courts are lightened in setting their awards: No court needs to
figure out how much to remit its award because another court
has given (or might yet give) punishment for the same act.40 It
also does not matter how many other such cases there will be.
A corollary is that Court 1 then has no need to predict whether
its outcome will encourage future lawsuits in Courts 2, 3, or 4.
2. Anti-gaming and Robustness
For similar reasons, the concurrence approach is also “robust” to later changes in other courts’ awards. This is a potential advantage over the alternative solution of barring subsequent awards. Suppose that a given state bars Plaintiff 2 from
seeking punitive damages because an earlier case has already
awarded them to Plaintiff 1.41 But what if Plaintiff 1’s award is
later reduced or overturned on appeal? Plaintiff 2’s award
cannot then be increased, unless that case can be reopened for
new proceedings on damages, and so the defendant may well
gain a windfall.
The use of concurrent damages, by contrast, can avoid such
a lapse in punishment and deterrence because Plaintiff 2’s

By contrast, under a forward-looking scheme like Minnesota’s, Court 1
must speculate as to what subsequent courts might do because punitive
damages in the present case are to be assessed (and thus pre-adjusted) with
an eye toward “the total effect of other punishment likely to be imposed
upon the defendant.” Minn. Stat. § 549.20 subdiv. 3 (2012).
41 This can occur in first-come, first-served states such as Florida. See Fla.
Stat. § 768.73(2)(a) (2013) (“[P]unitive damages may not be awarded against
a defendant in a civil action if that defendant establishes . . . that punitive
damages have previously been awarded against that defendant in any state
or federal court in any action alleging harm from the same act or single
course of conduct for which the claimant seeks compensatory damages.”).
40
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formal award will have already been declared in full. No matter what happens to Plaintiff 1’s punitive award, the defendant
remains on the hook for at least the amount announced for
Plaintiff 2.42
The same advantage applies to forward-looking reductions
as well: What if Plaintiff 1’s punitive damages are preemptively reduced (as some courts have done)43 due to a worry
that future plaintiffs might also sue—but then it turns out that
no other plaintiffs come forward? Again, using concurrent
damages can avoid the problem of remittitur regret.
A closely related advantage is that the concurrence approach
takes the profit out of manipulative gaming of the system (by
either side). As a foil, consider those states that have adopted a
first-come, first-served approach, barring punitive awards beyond the first case that awards them.44 The opportunities for
gaming by defendants are self-evident: litigating against the
weakest plaintiff first, forum shopping, and so forth. The concurrence approach eliminates such incentives for manipulation, both because it requires each court to declare the full
amount of the proper punitive award and because, crucially,
the defendant will always end up having to pay the highest

An alternative approach of reducing or offsetting a later punitive award
by the amount of earlier awards could in theory share this advantage, if in
operation the credit for an earlier award could be revoked as needed.
43 One such example is Judge Friendly’s case. See Roginsky v. RichardsonMerrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 838–44 (2d Cir. 1967). Again, Minnesota’s punitive damages statute also invites such speculative, anticipatory reduction.
See supra note 40.
44 Florida is a leading example. See supra note 41. Other states have resisted this approach. See, e.g., Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly,
976 S.W.2d 409, 413 (Ky. 1998) (“[I]t would be unfair to this plaintiff to bar
his claim for punitive damages just because other plaintiffs have previously
recovered damages arising out of the same conduct.”).
42
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formal amount.45 In a parallel way, if anticipatory concurrence
is known to be available, its general use can avoid the sort of
racing to the courthouse by plaintiffs that is likely to occur under those alternative solutions that favor the first plaintiff
(such as offsets or bars on later awards).46
3. Complementing Preclusion Law
The law of preclusion does not solve the redundant punitive
damages problem. To the contrary—nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel, as endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,47 potentially allows Plaintiff 2 to
Note that this advantage is shared by the “offset” approach adopted in
a handful of states. See infra note 46.
46 For an example of an offset policy, see Mo. Rev. Stat. § 510.263(4) (2000),
which describes an offset system whereby a later punitive damages award
is reduced by the amount of a prior punitive damages award. Notably, this
Missouri statute generated a dispute over how to apply the offset when two
cases proceeded at roughly the same time and their sequencing became
tangled. See Barnett v. La Societe Anonyme Turbomeca, 963 S.W.2d. 639,
653–54 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). Other states with an offset system include
Oklahoma and Oregon. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 9.1(C)(2) (West 2011)
(providing that the “[t]rial court shall reduce any award for punitive damages” by the amount of punitive damages the defendant has previously
paid); Or. Rev. Stat. § 31.730(3) (2013) (“In reducing awards of punitive
damages . . . the court shall consider the amount of any previous judgment
for punitive damages entered against the same defendant for the same conduct giving rise to a claim for punitive damages.”). Some states allow previous awards to be considered in assessing a new award. See Gagnon v.
Continental Cas. Co., 260 Cal. Rptr. 305, 306–07 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (noting
that “whether punitive damages previously have been imposed for the
same conduct” is a relevant consideration in deciding the amount of a punitive damage award); Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d
35, 38 (Tex. 1998) (“[E]vidence about . . . previously paid punitive damage
awards . . . for the same course of conduct is relevant and may be admitted
when a defendant offers it to mitigate punitive damages.”).
47 439 U.S. 322, 329–31 (1979) (upholding federal court’s application of
nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel, in its discretion, while also articu45
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piggyback on Plaintiff 1’s victory.48 Asymmetrically, however,
the defendant cannot make use of Plaintiff 1’s victory and
windfall against Plaintiff 2.49 (Nor could it use Plaintiff 1’s
loss.) This may all be quite sensible as far as the law of preclusion goes. But the asymmetry feeds the repetitive damages
problem by encouraging piggybacking by Plaintiff 2, Plaintiff
3, and so forth. The use of concurrent punitive damages rebalances this asymmetry by deflating the incentives to pile on,
and, more generally, by reducing redundancy in the awards
that might result.
Another preclusion device sometimes touted as a potential
solution—the mandatory punitive damages class action—has
yet to prove palatable to the courts,50 and the outlook is not
lating factors to be considered by the courts in exercising this discretion).
Note that the Parklane factors tend not to be especially useful for counseling
a court against applying preclusion in the context of redundant punitive
damages. For instance, although one factor is whether plaintiffs are likely to
take advantage of the availability of preclusion by waiting until another
plaintiff wins, such a strategy seems unlikely for plaintiffs seeking punitive
damages—who, if anything, may tend to race to the courthouse instead. See
id. at 330 (describing the “wait and see” criterion). Similarly, the worry that
the “defendant in the first action is sued for small or nominal damages”
and may thus have “little incentive to defend vigorously” seems plainly irrelevant in cases involving punitive damages. Id.
48 Likewise, the same phenomenon may occur in the many states that also
permit nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel. See, e.g., Tofany v. NBS
Imaging Sys., 616 N.E.2d 1034, 1038 (Ind. 1993) (endorsing the use of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel); Falgren v. Bd. of Teaching, 545
N.W.2d 901, 907–08 (Minn. 1996) (same); In re Caranchini, 956 S.W.2d 910,
914 (Mo. 1997) (same); Silva v. State, 745 P.2d 380, 384 (N.M. 1987) (same);
Koch v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 468 N.E.2d 1, 6 (N.Y. 1984) (same).
49 See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 884 (2008) (noting that, generally,
nonparties cannot be bound by the preclusive effect of past judgments or
findings, except under limited conditions).
50 For now, the one shining example, in the case of the Exxon Valdez oil
spill, remains an anomaly. See Linda S. Mullenix, Nine Lives: The Punitive
Damages Class, 58 U. Kan. L. Rev. 845, 863–67 (2010) (recognizing the Exxon
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promising.51 And of course, it cannot be a general solution, because many redundant punitive damages situations are unsuitable for the class action form. One might then suppose that
non-class aggregation—such as consolidation—may be able to
do some good, but that approach depends on whether the
cases are all located in the same state or are removable to (or
already within) the federal system.52 Concurrence, by contrast,
is used by a court unilaterally53—and does not depend on any
such happenstance of procedural alignment with other cases.
A deeper problem remains, anyway, in relying on aggregation devices (including non-class forms): There is no guarantee
that aggregated proceedings will result in lower awards than
in separately tried cases. True, there may be some natural
compression when a single court deals out the punitive damValdez case to be a unique instance of the mandatory punitive damages
class). The Exxon Valdez example is also anomalous in that punitive damages were barred in parallel state court litigation based on “deference to
[the] federal court order creating a federal mandatory punitive damages
class.” Chenega Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 991 P.2d 769, 775 (Alaska 1999).
There is no general guarantee, of course, that any future court would defer
to another in this way.
51 See In re Simon II Litig., 407 F.3d 125, 134–36 (2d Cir. 2005) (rejecting
District Judge Jack Weinstein’s attempt to certify a mandatory punitive
damages class using a “limited punishment” theory). Given the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent habit of raising the bar for class certification at almost
every turn, the prospects for class-action solutions to the redundant punitive damages problem appear grim.
52 Moreover, consolidation can bring together only cases that are already
pending; when claims arise over time, it is easy to imagine situations where
“consolidation would not prevent multiple punitive damages awards.”
Richard A. Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing
the Problems of Fairness, Efficiency and Control, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 37, 62
n.141 (1983).
53 The tradeoff entailed by the unilateral nature of the use of concurrence
is, of course, that earlier and later courts addressing the same conduct by
the same defendant might nonetheless disagree about whether (and to what
extent) concurrence should be used. See supra Subsection I.A.3.
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ages for many plaintiffs at once.54 But think of juries calculating punitive damages by applying a multiplier to compensatory damages; the sum total punitive amount would be the
same whether the cases were aggregated or tried one by one.
This is where a concurrence option can be crucial, allowing the
compression to happen as the court deems appropriate. To be
clear, concurrence can work in the absence of aggregation—the
point here is that concurrence may in fact be needed for aggregation to do any real work at all.

For instance, a deterrence-focused court that would have assessed a
higher multiplier (1/P) in a single-plaintiff case might, in an aggregated
case, recognize that P is in fact higher (and hence the proper multiplier
should be lower).
54
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II. HYPER-ENFORCEMENT OF STATUTORY DAMAGES
Damages of at least $750 per song;55 at least $1000 per unauthorized login;56 at least $5500 per false invoice57; and at least
$10,000 per wiretap58—the high dollar ranges often found in
statutory damages provisions carry an unmistakable in terrorem message. One might understand the not-so-subtle warning as: “Even if you think your chances of getting caught are
low, penalties like these make it not worth the risk.” One
might also perceive a message aimed at potential plaintiffs:
“Penalties like these make it worth your while to sue.”59
Both messages reflect aims that are said to motivate the use
of minimum awards in statutory damages schemes: respec-

Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012) (providing a standard
range of $750 to $30,000 per work, if the infringements are not willful).
56 Electronic Communications Privacy Act (Title II, or the Stored Communications Act), 18 U.S.C. § 2707(c) (2012) (“[I]n no case shall a person entitled to recover receive less than the sum of $1,000.”). As glossed by the
courts, this is calculated as a per-intrusion amount. See Pure Power Boot
Camp, Inc. v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, LLC, 759 F. Supp. 2d 417, 428–29
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 355 B.R. 225, 232 (D. Haw.
2006). The nuances of the courts’ interpretations of this provision are discussed in Subsection II.A.1 of my earlier article. See Huang, supra note 8, at
747-50.
57 False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2006) (mandating “a civil penalty
of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000”). This range, currently
adjusted for inflation, is $5,500 to $11,000.
58 Electronic Communications Privacy Act (Title III, or the Wiretap Act),
18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(2)(B) (2012) (mandating “statutory damages of whichever is the greater of $100 a day for each day of violation or $10,000”).
59 See, e.g., Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t, 331 F.3d 13, 22 (2d Cir. 2003)
(noting that minimum statutory damages in the Cable Act are intended “to
encourage the filing of individual lawsuits . . . often because there would
otherwise be no incentive to bring an individual claim”); see also infra note
62.
55
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tively, deterrence and inducing litigation.60 Each aim is vulnerable, however, to what we might call the problem of “hyperenforcement”: when the levels of enforcement (or the chances
of proving liability) turn out to be higher than anticipated in
the statutory design, leading to overdeterrence in expectation
and possibly to surprisingly punitive levels of damages.61 This
Part considers each vulnerability in turn, explaining how the
notions of “fixed” and “variable” damages map onto each
problem—and how the procedural device of running damages
concurrently can be used to solve it.
A. Redundant Inducements to Sue
The high per-count ranges or minimums in certain statutory
damages provisions are said to have the purpose of “encourag[ing] the prosecution of cases that would otherwise be
The messages also interact, of course, not least in suggesting to defendants that plaintiffs are likely to sue—thus giving more force to the deterrent effect.
61 Note that even the statutory damages schemes that include amplified
ranges of per-count awards (such as for “willful” or more egregious behavior)—and thus have a punitive flavor—can reach “surprisingly” punitive
levels if those ranges are set based on predictions of a lower probability of
successful enforcement than turns out to be true. More generally, it has not
gone unnoticed that statutory damages may acquire a punitive effect. See
Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright
Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 439, 462 (2009)
(“Even when judges or juries do not explicitly say they are intent on punishing defendants, the [statutory damages] awards they sometimes make
are punitive in effect.”). In practice, however, whether they have such a punitive effect may have little or no effect on appellate review, as long as the
damages remain within the statutory limits. See 4 Melville B. Nimmer &
David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 14.04(B)(1)(a) (2009) (“Although
the standards enunciated for awarding statutory damages run from approval of a punitive approach to disapproval of punishment, those standards are largely precatory; as long as the district court acts within the prescribed statutory limits, its discretion will probably be upheld on appeal.”).
60
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too costly for an individual plaintiff to pursue.”62 That is, the
minimum award per count is artificially inflated to include an
inducement to bring suit. The problem with this system is selfevident: Ideally, such a bonus for inducing suit would not be
embedded in the per-count award, but rather take the form of a
fixed per-case subsidy. Yet in reality the per-count bonus remains typical of statutory damages schemes.63
Embedded in each statutory award, then, is a bonus to induce litigation that should not be automatically repeated with
every further count. Whatever the level of the desired litigation
subsidy, it is a “fixed” and not a “variable” component of the
damages in a given enforcement action.64 With more and more

62 Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t, 631 F. Supp. 2d 242, 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2009);
accord Parker, 331 F.3d at 22 (noting that, in a Cable Act case, minimum percustomer statutory damages are imposed “usually in order to encourage
the filing of individual lawsuits”); see also Sony BMG Music Entm’t v.
Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 115 (D. Mass. 2010), aff’d in part, vacated in
part, 660 F.3d 487 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting that the Copyright Act’s “statutory
damages ranges likely include some amount to compensate copyright owners for the costs entailed in investigating and detecting infringing behavior,” and citing a report of the Register of Copyrights, which noted the aim
of ensuring recovery adequate “to warrant the expense of detecting infringements”); Forman v. Data Transfer Inc., 164 F.R.D. 400, 404 (E.D. Pa.
1995) (noting that the Telephone Consumer Protection Act’s statutory damages minimum of $500 per violation “is designed to provide adequate incentive for an individual plaintiff to bring suit on his own behalf”).
63 The problems with the linearity of per-count award schemes may simply have escaped the attention of the drafters of some such statutes. In the
case of the Copyright Act, the drafters appear to have dismissed the possibility out of hand: “We believe that the danger of exorbitant awards in multiple infringement cases is more theoretical than real. . . . We know of no
case where the resulting total was considered excessive.” General Revision
of the U.S. Copyright Laws, 3 Omnibus Copyright Revision History 105
(George S. Grossman ed., 2001).
64 The analysis offered here can easily be adapted to situations in which
the desired litigation subsidy increases (though not linearly) with the num-
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counts, as the artificially inflated per-count awards stack up,
any need for further encouragement evaporates.65 In cases with
a large number of counts, moreover, such stacking-up will rapidly outstrip the ideal level of damages and reach heights fairly
described as “surprisingly punitive.” See Figure 1.
The best known variation of this hyper-enforcement problem occurs when class actions are brought seeking statutory
damages for each of thousands or even millions of total
counts.66 Most famous may be the proposed class of 12 million
Time Warner customers—in a case about disclosure of customer information—in which the statutory minimum of $1000
per count would imply a minimum of $12 billion in damages.67
Or consider the potentially $1.9 billion in statutory damages
claimed against Chuck E. Cheese for a technical violation in the
printing of millions of customer receipts.68

ber of plaintiffs or violations. But for exposition’s sake, the implicit assumption is that the desired inducement subsidy is fixed per case.
65 One potential complication here is that in some cases it may take multiple counts’ worth of accumulated bonuses before reaching the supposedly
desired level of litigation subsidy; if so, it is only after such a threshold is
met that the further litigation bonuses become redundant.
66 For a collection of cases, see Sheila B. Scheuerman, Due Process Forgotten: The Problem of Statutory Damages and Class Actions, 74 Mo. L. Rev.
103, 105–06 (2009).
67 See Parker, 331 F.3d 13. The assumption running throughout the following analysis, perhaps a debatable one, is that the $1000 minimum is more
than the true harm to each victim (of the unacknowledged disclosures)—so
that not all of it is properly considered “variable” in our conceptual framework. Were this amount deemed to be entirely a “variable” component, of
course, then there would be no cause for concern, and a court could simply
forgo the use of concurrence in such a case.
68 Blanco v. CEC Entm’t Concepts L.P., No. CV 07-0559 GPS (JWJx), 2008
WL 239658 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2008). This and other startling cases under the
federal Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, as well as the rather
weak Congressional response to such cases (namely, creating a grace period
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What is wrong here, observers typically say, is that such a
litigation bonus becomes extraneous when the class action device is available as an alternative solution to the problem of enforcing small individual claims.69 As a leading commentator
neatly put it, the standard worry is “that class treatment would
turn the per-customer statutory damages . . . into a hammer so
heavy as to be beyond any plausible account of the underlying
remedial scheme . . . [b]ecause Congress already had set the
remedial scheme to make claims worthwhile on a disaggregated basis.”70
But that cannot be the whole problem. After all, it is not
multi-party aggregation per se that is driving the surprisingly
punitive amount at stake. Rather, the driver is simply the huge
for a narrow category of non-willful violations), are discussed in Scheuerman, supra note 66, at 105–06 & n.11.
69 See, e.g., Parker, 331 F.3d at 22 (“We acknowledge Judge Glasser’s legitimate concern that the potential for a devastatingly large damages
award, out of all reasonable proportion to the actual harm suffered by
members of the plaintiff class, may raise due process issues. Those issues
arise from the effects of combining a statutory scheme that imposes minimum statutory damages awards on a per-consumer basis—usually in order
to encourage the filing of individual lawsuits as a means of private enforcement of consumer protection laws—with the class action mechanism
that aggregates many claims—often because there would otherwise be no
incentive to bring an individual claim.”).
70 Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 Colum. L. Rev.
1872, 1903 (2006) (discussing Parker, 331 F.3d 13); see also Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of
Shady Grove, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 17, 73–74 (2010) (discussing tension between
“the possibility of crushing aggregate penalties” and “providing remedies
that will induce individual enforcement”); J. Maria Glover, The Structural
Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 1137, 1191–92 (2012) (noting possible “remedial overkill”); cf. Shady
Grove Orthopedic Assocs., v. Allstate Ins., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1472 (2010)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (analogizing class action limitation to damages
cap).
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number of counts. And a large number of counts is possible
even when there is only a single plaintiff. Thus, even if the
class-action difficulty can be averted, say, by a refusal to certify
such a class, the general problem does not go away so easily.
A more general solution may be possible, however. In both
the single-plaintiff scenario and the class action variant, a concurrent damages option can be used to counteract such excessive piling-on of the litigation bonus. There are at least two
ways to use concurrent damages here.71 First, taking a cruder
approach, a court can truncate the accumulation of damages
(beyond a certain desired level of total award) by running any
further counts concurrently.
Second, taking a more conceptually precise approach, the
court can designate a fraction of each count’s award as representing the “variable” component—for instance, reflecting the
harm done by each count. The remaining fraction of each
award would then be counted toward the litigation subsidy;
thus, for any counts beyond those needed to reach the desired
level of subsidy, the court would run those portions concurrently. See Figure 2. After that point, only the variable portion
of each award would be allowed to accumulate for each further count, and properly so.72
Either way, in the class action variant of the problem, the properly contained amount would then be allocated among the class.
72 As is evident from comparing Figures 1 and 2, the approach described
here creates a damages curve lying between the subsidized harm curve and
the unsubsidized harm curve (and parallel to both). A court wishing instead to approximate the subsidized harm curve can do so simply by allowing more per-count subsidies to accumulate first (in effect, following the
statutory damages curve until it meets the subsidized harm curve in Figure
1, before starting to run concurrently any further per-count subsidies). In
theory, a court can also approximate the unsubsidized harm curve while
taking advantage of the per-count subsidies—though such a path is probably too complicated to be attractive in practice (namely, following the statutory damages curve until reaching the level of desired subsidy, then flat71
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B. More Counts, More Enforcement?
A more general problem of hyper-enforcement can occur
when statutory damages are understood to serve deterrence.73
In copyright, for example, statutory damages are said to serve
not only to compensate but also to “discourage wrongful conduct”;74 they “furnish the deterrence . . . necessary for prospective infringers.”75 For trademark violations, they are aimed
partly at compensation and partly “at deterrence of future
counterfeiting—both by the bad actor in question and by other
potential counterfeiters.”76 Notably, some statements suggest
that the statutory penalties are inflated because the real or perceived probability of being penalized is low. For example, leg-

lining by running entire per-count awards concurrently, before proceeding
up the unsubsidized harm curve once it surpasses the level of desired subsidy).
73 The following exposition will speak in terms of optimal deterrence, but
the main points are easily translatable to absolute deterrence (by substituting gains for harms, as the touchstone).
74 F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233
(1952).
75 Staff of S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., Copyright Law Revision,
Studies 22–25, at 9 (Comm. Print 1960). These studies are taken as legislative history for the Copyright Act of 1976. See also Staff of H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 87th Cong., Rep. of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law 103 (Comm. Print 1961), reprinted in 3
Omnibus Copyright Revision Legislative History (George S. Grossman ed.,
1976) (“[S]tatutory damages are intended (1) to assure adequate compensation . . . and (2) to deter infringement.”).
76 Stark Carpet Corp. v. Stark Carpet & Flooring Installations Corp., 954
F. Supp. 2d 145, 154 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); see also Burberry Ltd. v. Euro Moda,
Inc., No. 08 Civ. 5781 (CM) (AJP), 2009 WL 4432678, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4,
2009) (observing that the award should operate “to discourage further
wrongdoing by the defendant and others”); Staff of H. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 75, at 156 (noting that the award “will serve both as a specific deterrent for Defendant and a general deterrent for others contemplating the infringement of valid trademarks”).
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islative history accompanying an enhancement to the statutory
damages provisions of the Copyright Act expressly noted,
about downloading and file-sharing, that “[m]any computer
users . . . simply believe that they will not be caught or prosecuted for their conduct” and that thus “more stringent deterrents” were needed.77
One might thus view the high dollar awards specified in
some statutes as making up for presumptively low probabilities of detection, litigation, or proof.78 (This aim has also been
recognized, of course, as one purpose served by punitive damages.79) But what if the resulting statutory awards ranges are

H.R. Rep. No. 106-216, at 2–3 (1999) (explaining the purpose of House
Bill 1761, which became part of the Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright
Damages Improvement Act of 1999). For an analysis of file-sharing liability
in light of the Copyright Act’s history, see Peter S. Menell, In Search of
Copyright’s Lost Ark: Interpreting the Right to Distribute in the Internet
Age, 59 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 1 (2011).
78 See, e.g., Williams v. Pub. Fin. Corp., 598 F.2d 349, 355–56 (5th Cir. 1979)
(explaining that the Truth-in-Lending Act provision awarding plaintiff actual damages plus twice the finance charge of the loan, and all attorney and
court costs, is “designed to deter generally illegalities which are only rarely
uncovered and punished”); Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. LY USA, No. 06
Civ. 13463(AKH), 2008 WL 5637161, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2008) (explaining
that statutory damages are useful when counterfeiters’ records are “nonexistent, inadequate or deceptively kept in order to willfully deflate the
level of counterfeiting activity actually engaged in, making proving actual
damages in these cases extremely difficult if not impossible”). For a fuller
discussion of the variety of reasons for enhancing damages to compensate
for a low probability of sanction, see Sharkey, supra note 4, at 366–67. For
an economic analysis, see Keith Hylton & Thomas Miceli, Should Tort
Damages Be Multiplied?, 21 J.L. Econ. & Org. 388 (2005).
79 See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996) (noting that
“[a] higher ratio may also be justified in cases in which the injury is hard to
detect”).
77
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based on assumptions of low enforcement—and yet actual enforcement turns out to be higher?80
The following analysis focuses on one intuitive but tricky
form of this problem: when the probability of successful enforcement increases with the number of violations.81 It is easy
to imagine why this may occur. Private enforcers may be more
motivated to pursue cases with higher counts and thus higher
potential winnings.82 Some public enforcers may also act this
way.83 More mechanically, monitoring by both private and

The general problem of setting deterrence multipliers when enforcement probabilities can change (such as based on the salience or seriousness
of the offense) is thoroughly examined in Richard Craswell, Deterrence and
Damages: The Multiplier Principle and Its Alternatives, 97 Mich. L. Rev.
2185 (1999).
81 What makes this variant of the problem more difficult is that the seemingly direct approach—adjusting the statutory minimum up or down—is
not a well-tailored solution to the problem of variation in probabilities from
case to case.
82 Class actions, of course, are the archetype of this phenomenon. Punitive
damages are also seen as motivating for plaintiffs in a similar way. See, e.g.,
Dan B. Dobbs, Ending Punishment in “Punitive” Damages: DeterrenceMeasured Remedies, 40 Ala. L. Rev. 831, 846–47 (1989) (“In some cases
damages may be so limited that the citizen who considers suing is discouraged from doing so, even though a suit would be socially useful. . . . The
potential of a punitive award may make a claim worthwhile that otherwise
would not be.”); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages:
An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 869, 895 (1998) (explaining that
punitive damages, by incentivizing suits, decrease the chances that a defendant will escape liability).
83 Joint public-private enforcement also occurs in some contexts, such as in
qui tam litigation under the False Claims Act. See David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence from Qui Tam
Litigation, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1244 (2012) (empirically assessing qui tam
litigation). For evidence that public enforcers differentiate between larger
and smaller targets in their likelihood of pursuing enforcement, see, e.g.,
Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry: Evidence from Enforcement Against Broker-Dealers, 67 Bus. Law. 679, 682, 685 (2012).
80
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public enforcers may be more likely to detect actors who engage in multiple violations—and likewise, proof of wrongdoing may be easier to establish.84
The device of concurrent damages can be used to neutralize
the extra multiplier for expected damages caused by such increases in the probability of successful enforcement. (It should
be emphasized that the use of concurrence does not imply undercompensating plaintiffs. Recall that the awards are assumed to be already inflated beyond actual harm, by design;
the use of concurrence in effect adjusts the degree of that inflation.)
To illustrate, think of a fast-flowing river, and assume that
each discharge of pollutants by a factory causes the same
amount of harm. For instance, each successive discharge may
contaminate the river water in essentially the same way—say,
temporarily raising the concentration of contaminants from
zero to a certain amount. Now consider two factories, each discharging ten times (and thus their activities are equally harmful) in its own river. Factory 1 does so over the course of one
day. Factory 2 does so once a day for ten days. It is easy to
imagine how the chance of detection for Factory 2 could be
higher than for Factory 1; indeed, the probability may well be
ten times higher. This would be the case, for instance, if the enforcer monitors by auditing, randomly choosing one day a
month to observe water quality in a given river.85

Moreover, a rise in expected per-count penalties may increase with N
(the number of counts) for other reasons. For example, proving a higher N
may also raise the chance of proving the behavior to be willful or knowing—thus triggering further statutory multipliers, such as treble damages.
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2012) (increased maximum under the Copyright Act); 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2006) (treble damages under the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act).
85 This auditing method is constructed so that the probability of detection
for each factory can be calculated simply as the ratio (number of days in
84
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Assume that discovery of any single discharge leads to the
eventual revelation of each factory’s complete polluting behavior.86 The expected penalty internalized by Factory 2 would
thus be ten times greater than for Factory 1, even though for
optimal deterrence they should be internalizing the (same) total harm they each cause.87 If the statutory penalty is appropriately set for deterring Factory 1, then it is ten times too large
for Factory 2.

which any discharge occurs/number of days in the month). This simplification is for exposition’s sake, and of course other relationships between the
number of counts and the probability of enforcement are possible. For
variations, including the more difficult problem when the probability increases faster than proportionally with the increase in counts, see infra note
95, .
86 One judge has noticed such a problem in the context of the Copyright
Act:
However, the Copyright Act does not contain a provision to correct
for the fact that once a recording company has decided to devote the
resources necessary to detect one act of infringement by a file sharer,
the marginal cost of detecting additional acts of infringement is likely
low since the investigation of the file sharer’s account on a peer-topeer network will generally reveal a treasure trove of unlawfully
downloaded works. As a result, the imposition of statutory damages
in file-sharing cases where multiple copyrighted works have been infringed can produce awards much greater than necessary to provide
copyright owners with an adequate incentive to investigate and detect
infringement.
Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 115 (D. Mass.
2010) (Gertner, J.).
87 The assumption, as before, is that the penalty is applied to each discharge separately if they occur on the same day. This is the reading courts
have given to the Clean Water Act’s damages under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d)
(2006). See Borden Ranch P’ship v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 261 F.3d 810,
817–18 (2001) (interpreting “per day for each violation” under 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(d)).
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Consider now Factory 3, which discharges only once—say,
on the first day.88 Factory 2 causes ten times as much harm as
Factory 3, and yet its expected penalty is one hundred times
higher (because its probability of detection is also ten times
higher). As before, Factory 2’s penalty needs to be compressed
by a factor of ten. This contrast between Factory 2 and Factory
3 sets in sharp relief the difficulty for any court trying to articulate the reason for compressing Factory 2’s damages,89 if it
were to do so by directly reducing the per-count award.
Imagine what the court would have to say: “The award per
discharge for the factory with ten violations should be lower
than for the factory that did it only once—and in fact, it should
be only one-tenth as large.” It may well be possible for the
court to explain this (logically sound) discount, but the seeming injustice of it may remain a practical obstacle.
1. Using Concurrent Damages
The option of running damages concurrently offers an alternative way to compensate for the extra multiplier on expected
damages, due to a higher probability of enforcement, in cases
where the statutory award range was set assuming a lower
probability.90 It is especially useful when a minimum statutory
award precludes lowering the per-count award directly, of
course, but it is also useful when such an artificial adjustment
is undesirable even if the range would allow it.91
Thus Factory 3, like Factory 1, faces accurate incentives from the optimal deterrence perspective.
89 Doing so would be tricky in either an opinion or jury instructions.
90 The order-of-magnitude errors that are possible are not easy to accept
as “rough justice,” even if the probabilities at issue are knowable only as
rough approximations.
91 The potential disadvantages of such “artificial averaging” or fictional
pricing are explored in my earlier article. See Huang, supra note 8, at 738–
41.
88
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To see its application in the case of the three factories, assume as before that the statutory per-count award is set appropriately for Factories 1 and 3 (that is, it is inflated to account for their low chances of being sanctioned). For Factory 2,
then, the court would recognize the ten counts, one for each
discharge—but run them all concurrently. On this illustration’s
assumptions, such a compression exactly adjusts for the extra
multiplier due to this polluter’s higher probability of detection.
The use of concurrence can be readily generalized (beyond
such a stylized illustration) through the careful application of
our conceptual framework of “fixed” and “variable” portions
of damages. The key is understanding these components to be
responsive to the probabilities of successful enforcement. As
the probability increases, the “variable” component of each
award diminishes (for the simple reason that there is less of a
need for the artificial per-count boost meant to make up for
low probabilities). Thus, in the case of Factory 2, the “variable”
component is one-tenth of each award, rather than the full
award; only that fraction should be repeated for each of the ten
counts. In essence, then, the court is running the remaining
nine-tenths of each per-count award concurrently with all
other awards.92 This is the more conceptually precise—and
more generalizable—way of understanding what is described
in the simplified illustration above as running all the counts
concurrently.
2. Enforcement Motivations
One further intuitive and possibly more realistic variation
should be addressed: What if the reason for the increase in
probability is partly motivational—say, because the enforcer is
The similarity should thus be quite apparent between this usage and the
use of anticipatory concurrence in the punitive damages setting, as described in Subsection I.A.3.
92
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more likely to pursue a case with a larger potential recovery?93
Consider a Factory 4 that discharges on five separate days,
twice a day. It thus faces a five times greater chance of being
caught in an audit than Factory 3. Suppose further that, upon
detection, the enforcer is twice as likely to pursue a “large”
case (say, one with a potential recovery of at least ten times the
single-discharge award). Factory 4 therefore faces a ten times
higher chance of sanction than Factory 3. But now the needed
compression is no longer achieved by running all ten counts
concurrently (unlike for Factory 2). Rather, it is achieved by
running the ten counts concurrently as two awards (compressing by a factor of five)—which if anticipated by the enforcer
would lead to a further reduction in the chance of enforcement
(by a factor of two), thereby resulting in the correct degree of
deterrence.94
Notice how the use of concurrent damages would properly
deflate the motivation to enforce, whether the exaggeration
factor is two (as above) or some other number X. This mechanism implies that the court faces conveniently low information
demands: To achieve proper deterrence, nothing had to be
known about how much the enforcer’s motivation might be
exaggerated by the size of the award. The reason is simply that
the concurrent damages option is used to reach the accurate
An analogous story can be told in which the enforcer is more likely to
audit in the first place, when it knows that there is bigger game to be
caught.
94 The question arises whether this shift from more to less avid enforcement is a good thing. The answer necessarily varies by context, of course.
One might argue, for instance, that it is good for public enforcers (because
of savings to the fisc) but bad for private enforcers (from the ex post perspective, as some would not pursue compensation). For an analysis suggesting that costly private enforcement, induced by high potential damages, can be welfare-reducing, see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation for the Level of Liability, 17 J. Legal Stud. 151 (1988).
93
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award; consequently, any amount of an enforcer’s extra motivation from anticipating a further windfall would be deflated
just by bringing the award down to size.95
CONCLUSION: ON ACOUSTIC SEPARATION
Consider the following thought experiment, which overturns a central assumption of the preceding analysis: What if
the excessive damages described thus far are not unexpected
or unintended but instead are purposeful messages aimed at
deterring a class of overconfident actors who misperceive their
chances of escaping liability as better than they actually are?
Up to now, it has been assumed that violators know when
their probability of liability is low and when it is high. But
their perceptions may not be correct. What if they are overconfident about getting away with their misconduct? For deterrence purposes, it may be better for such overconfident actors
not to know that concurrence may be used, even if will be.96
Several technical notes are in order. It is probably too far a stretch to
think that the following variations could be identified by the court in any
real case (beyond the simplest kind of rough proportionality suggested in
the text), but they are worth noting for the sake of completeness. First, what
if P increases more slowly than N? If the chance of enforcement increases
(1/F) times as fast as N, then the N concurrence awards should be run concurrently as F awards. Second, what if P increases faster than N? If it is not
possible to run N awards concurrently as a fraction of an award, then concurrence can only partially adjust toward the accurate multiplier (unless
there is the dual mechanism at work, as noted above). Finally, what happens when P reaches 1, at a high enough N? The court should no longer increase its compression beyond that point, of course. This seems an unlikely
concern in many relevant contexts, as the chance of enforcement is not often
one hundred percent.
96 Recall the story of Factory 2 by the river, discharging on ten different
days. Its expected damages are inflated by a factor of ten because the probability of detection increases with the number of days of discharge (and the
polluter knows it). What if instead this polluter does not anticipate that discharging on more days entails a greater chance of being caught? Precisely
95

DRAFT – AUG. 2014

43
And if all violators were overconfident in this way, then there
might be no use for concurrence.
But the problem is the existence of other actors who have
more accurate perceptions. For them, believing that concurrence can and will be used is what prevents overdeterrence.97
This tension forces a tradeoff for the legal designer deciding
whether to include a concurrence option, and for the court deciding whether to apply it. Should concurrent damages be
used, thus underdeterring the overoptimists—or not, thus
overdeterring the realists? Should concurrence be used, but the
damages range increased somewhat, as a compromise approach? Should concurrence be forgone, but the damages
range decreased?
A release from this dilemma may be possible when there is
“acoustic separation” in a concurrent damages regime; that is,
when the availability of concurrent damages is not salient to
some potential violators, due to their naivety about the legal
system.98 It then becomes possible to decouple what the overoptimists expect (a harsh damages regime) from what the realbecause it misperceives its own chances of enforcement, this polluter ends up
correctly deterred; in a sense, the relentless linearity of the damages schedule offsets overoptimism about evading detection.
97 Seeing the inflated statutory damages imposed without concurrence, as
suggested for the overoptimist’s case, would have an overdeterring effect
on these more realistic actors. Perhaps in a few cases it may be easy for such
a realistic actor to recognize that concurrence was forgone in a prior case
because the earlier actor was an overoptimistic type (for example, a seasoned illegal infringer of copyrighted music might see the defendants in the
Sony and Capitol Records end-user downloading cases as naïve and overoptimistic). See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899 (8th
Cir. 2012); Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, Civ. No. 07-11446-RWZ,
2012 WL 3639053 (D. Mass. Aug. 23, 2012). But generally, what happens in
prior cases probably casts a shadow for future actors in a more generic way.
98 The concept of “acoustic separation” is introduced in Meir Dan-Cohen,
Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal
Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625 (1984).
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ists expect (the potential use of concurrence)—if the overoptimists tend also to be more naïve about how damages are actually applied.99
But that is a big “if.” The correlation is presumably positive
in some contexts; those who are naïve about how damages are
assessed might tend to overlap with those who are unaware of
the real chances of enforcement. Still, poor overlap in a given
context would weaken the case for such decoupling through
acoustic separation. And in a plausible sort of reversed situation, with the sophisticates thinking they can elude detection,
acoustic separation should be actively avoided: These sophisticates need to know that concurrence will be properly forgone
in their cases, while the naïve need to be told that concurrence
will properly be used in theirs.

A similar logic applies to overoptimism of other sorts—such as about
the harm that may be done. For instance, in the statutory damages context,
if an overoptimist mistakenly thinks that she will not cause much harm
(and that therefore she will not be liable for much in damages), then the
harsh message of a linear statutory damages scheme may be just what she
needs to hear. It is an especially accurate message if she thinks her harms
are marginally diminishing, when in fact they do add up linearly. (In the
reverse situation, with the actor thinking her harms are linear when in fact
they are marginally diminishing, the court should use concurrence ex post—
and make this practice widely known ex ante. That is, acoustic separation
should be actively avoided.) For a fuller discussion of “diminishing marginal harm,” see Huang, supra note 8, at 730–35. Likewise, overoptimism
about gains may also be counteracted through such decoupling, if the aim is
absolute deterrence. In the case of gains, the information demands on the
court may seem unusual: How could a court have a more accurate sense of
the gains curve than the violator? For further analysis, see A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Liability Be Based on the Harm to the
Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?, 10 J.L. Econ. & Org. 427 (1994) (discussing costs of legal error under each approach).
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